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THE COPYRIGHT PROTECTABILITY OF 
ARCHITECTURAL WORKS: THE ELEVENTH 
CIRCUIT WALKS A THIN LINE 
THOMAS COMMONS† 
INTRODUCTION 
In response to the rapid literary growth during the 1800’s, 
the Swiss Government invited various countries to meet in 
Berne, Switzerland, in an attempt to establish international 
copyright unification.1  These meetings spawned the Berne 
Convention of 1886 (the “Convention”), which served as an 
international agreement to protect literary and artistic property.2  
Its most recent revision in 1971 extended the convention’s 
protection to “authors of works of architecture erected in a 
country of the Union or of other artistic works incorporated in a 
building or other structure located in a country of the Union.”3 
For over a century, the United States refused to accede to 
the Convention due to philosophical differences between the U.S. 
copyright system and the system enacted by the Convention.4  
The United States was mainly concerned that the Convention 
violated the Constitution, which expressed that enactment of 
copyright law should be meant for the benefit of the public.5  As 
the United States experienced rapid technological growth, U.S. 
copyright law evolved, making it easier for the United States to 
come into compliance with the Convention.6  The United States 
ultimately acceded to the Convention in 1988.7 
 
† Senior Staff, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., cum laude, 2016, St. John’s 
University School of Law; B.A., 2012, Chemistry, Hofstra University. 
1 Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in the 
Future, 3 J.L. & TECH. 1, 12–13 (1988). 
2 Id. at 1. 
3 Id. at 41. 
4 Id. at 67–68. 
5 Id. at 68 n.462. 
6 Id. at 67–68. 
7 Id. at 67. 
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The United States’s compliance with the Berne Convention 
has left United States Federal Courts with the troubling issue of 
how much protection architectural works should be afforded.8  If 
the copyright protection is too narrow, the law may create an 
insufficient incentive for architects to invest in creating 
innovative designs due to lack of protection from infringement.9  
Conversely, if copyright protection is too broad, the result may 
allow architects to possess too broad a monopoly over certain 
innovative designs.10 
The issue has led to a recent ruling by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which created a circuit 
split with the Eleventh Circuit.11  The Eleventh Circuit has 
concluded that architectural works are only subject to thin 
copyright protection,12 whereas the Second Circuit has concluded 
that architectural works should receive full protection under 
copyright law.13 
Part I of this Note discusses the history of copyright 
legislation in the United States regarding architectural works, as 
well the applicability of copyright law generally.  Part II 
discusses the circuit split between the Eleventh and Second 
Circuits with regard to how much protection architectural works 
should be afforded.  Part III analyzes the benefits and 
shortcomings of both approaches and how other courts should 
ultimately adopt the Second Circuit’s approach.  This Note 
argues that the Second Circuit’s approach is supported not only 
by statutory language and legislative history, but also by public 
policy and constitutional considerations, as well. 
 
8 See Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2014); 
Intervest Constr., Inc. v. Canterbury Estate Homes, Inc., 554 F.3d 914, 919 (11th 
Cir. 2008). 
9 Stephen D. Milbrath, The 11th Circuit's New Copyright Standard for 
Architectural Works, 83 NOV FLA. B.J. 49, 50–51 (2009). 
10 Id. at 51. 
11 Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 103–04. 
12 Intervest Constr., Inc., 554 F.3d at 919. 
13 Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 103–04; see Rolwes Co. v. Barnes, No. 4:14CV1045, 
2014 WL 3701039, at *3 (E.D. Mo. July 25, 2014) amended by No. 4:14CV1045, 2014 
WL 4966071 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2014). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. History of Copyright Legislation 
Under the Copyright Act of 1976, architectural plans fell 
within the definition of “pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
work[s],”14 which included two and three-dimensional designs but 
did not extend protection to works that were considered “useful 
articles.”15  The Act defined a “useful article” as an “article 
having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to 
portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.”16  
Courts have reasoned that “if design elements reflect a merger of 
aesthetic and functional considerations, the artistic aspects of a 
work cannot be said to be conceptually separable from the 
utilitarian elements.”17  As a result, architectural works received 
very limited protection under the Act.18  This is due to the fact 
that architectural works are almost always constructed with 
functional utility in mind as the basis for the structure. 
In response to joining the Berne Convention, Congress 
passed the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 
1990.19  The purpose of the Act was to create “a new category of 
protect[a]ble subject matter for architectural works.”20  
17 U.S.C. § 101 now defines architectural works as “the design of 
a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, 
including a building, architectural plans, or drawings.  The work 
includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and 
composition of spaces and elements in the design, but does not 
include individual standard features.”21 
 
14 ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 500 (Vicki Been et. al. eds., 6th ed. 2012). 
15 Id. at 482. The legislative history explains that the definition of “pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works” was intended by the Committee to “draw as clear a 
line as possible between copyrightable works of applied art and uncopyrighted works 
of industrial design.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 54–55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667–68;see MERGES ET AL., supra note 14, at 483. 
16 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 55, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668. 
17 Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
18 MERGES ET AL., supra note 14. 
19 Id. 
20 Vanessa N. Scaglione, Building Upon the Architectural Works Protection 
Copyright Act of 1990, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 193, 193 (1992). 
21 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
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B. Copyright Law Generally 
Over the years, courts have implemented various doctrines 
to determine whether one’s work is copyrightable.  Traditionally, 
copyright law has been meant to “promote the [p]rogress of 
[s]cience and useful [a]rts” by awarding protection to original 
works of original expression.22  Perhaps the most significant 
doctrine that limits the copyrightability of works is the idea-
expression dichotomy.  Under Title 17, full copyright protection is 
given to original works of authorship, but the protection does not 
extend to “any idea, procedure, process, system, method of 
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form 
in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in 
such work.”23  While one’s original expression is protected under 
copyright law, the ideas relating to such expression are not.24 
Another such application that a court will use is the merger 
doctrine.25  The doctrine establishes that “when there is only one 
or but a few ways of expressing an idea, then courts will find that 
the idea behind the work merges with its expression and the 
work is not copyrightable.”26  Courts will also look to see if the 
 
22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
23 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(b) (2012). See Sparaco v. Lawler, Matusky, Skelly, Eng’rs 
LLP, 303 F.3d 460, 469 (2d Cir. 2002). The court in Sparaco applied the idea-
expression dichotomy and held that an architectural plan for a building did not 
consist only of general ideas, but included “specific expression and realization of 
those ideas.” Id. The court went on to explain that there is no “simple bright-line 
test” to determine at what point an abstract idea becomes one’s original expression. 
Id. As a result, the court must examine the issue on a case-by-case basis. Id. 
24 MERGES ET AL., supra note 14, at 481; see Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 
(1879); Sparaco, 303 F.3d at 469. In Baker, the author of a book, which outlined the 
art of book-keeping, brought suit for copyright infringement against a defendant 
who had instituted the book’s teachings into their own book-keeping. 101 U.S. at 
100. The court found that there was no infringement, holding that while “no one has 
a right to print or publish his book, or any material part thereof, as a book intended 
to convey instruction in the art, any person may practise and use the art itself which 
he has described and illustrated therein.” Id. at 104. 
25 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 14, at 481; see generally Morrissey v. Procter & 
Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967). In Morrissey, the court was asked to 
examine the plaintiff’s copyright of a set of rules, which were used for a sales 
promotional “sweepstakes” that involved the participant disclosing their social 
security number. Id. at 676. The court found that the rules could not be protected 
under copyright law based on the merger doctrine. Id. at 678. The court reasoned 
that “[w]hen the uncopyrightable subject matter is very narrow, so that ‘the topic 
necessarily requires’ . . . if not only one form of expression, at best only a limited 
number, [permitting a copyright] . . . “could exhaust all possibilities of future use of 
the substance.” Id. (citations omitted). 
26 MERGES ET AL., supra note 14, at 481 (emphasis omitted). 
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work in question is in the “public domain.”27  While copyright law 
protects “original works of authorship,” it does not protect other 
aspects of the work that are in the public domain and “free for 
others to draw upon.”28  Such aspects include “the history [the 
work] describes, the facts it mentions, and the ideas it 
embraces.”29  Finally, courts will apply the “scènes-à-faire” 
doctrine.30  The doctrine states that elements, which are 
“standard” or “indispensable” with regard to a given topic, fall 
outside the scope of copyright protection.31  For example, cowboys 
and bank robbers in an American western film are standard 
elements and therefore receive no protection.32 
Generally, when bringing a claim for copyright infringement, 
one must prove two main elements.33  The plaintiff must prove 
(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) “copying of constituent 
elements of the work that are original.”34  At issue with regard to 
copyright infringement of architectural works is, what 
constitutes “too much copying,” and what aspects of the work are 
considered the architect’s original expression.35  Not all copying is 
automatically considered infringement because not all aspects of 
a copyrighted work are protected under copyright law.36 
A copyrighted work may consist of both original 
copyrightable elements and uncopyrightable, unoriginal 
elements.  Any copying of the unprotected elements will not be 
considered infringement.37  The similarity between works may 
derive only from unprotected elements, so when examining 
whether the works are “substantially similar,” the court must 
confine itself to the similarities that exist with regard to the 
protected elements of the works.38  To determine if the works are 
substantially similar, courts employ the “ordinary observer 
 
27 Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 2014). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 345. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 348. 
38 Id. 
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test.”39  Under the test, the two works are substantially similar if 
“the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, 
would be disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic 
appeal as the same.”40  When applying the ordinary observer test, 
courts have established that the work should be examined as a 
whole, rather than focus solely on the differences between the 
works.41 
When determining whether there is copyright infringement, 
it is essential to identify what type of work is allegedly being 
copied since different types of works receive different levels of 
protection.  In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service 
Co. Inc., the United States Supreme Court established that 
compiled works should receive only “thin” copyright protection.42  
Thin protection has traditionally protected only against verbatim 
reproduction of the original work.43  The protection is limited due 
to the fact that the range of possible expression is narrow.44  
Under Title 17, compiled works or compilations are defined as 
“work[s] formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting 
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in 
such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an 
original work of authorship.”45  Title 17 further requires that the 
compiled work be original in order to receive any protection 
under copyright law.46 
 
39 Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273 F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001); Knitwaves, Inc. v. 
Lollytogs Ltd. Inc., 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. 
Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). It is worth noting that “[t]he 
copying need not be of every detail so long as the copy is substantially similar to the 
copyrighted work.” Comptone Co., Ltd. v. Rayex Corp., 251 F.2d 487, 488 (2d Cir. 
1958). 
40 Boisson, 273 F.3d at 272; Knitwaves, Inc., 71 F.3d at 1002. Whether an 
ordinary observer would find the two works to be substantially similar is a question 
of fact best left for the jury to decide. See Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 616 F.3d 
904, 914 (9th Cir. 2010). The jury must determine if an “ordinary, reasonable 
observer viewing the works in their totality would perceive the allegedly infringing 
work to be substantially similar to the copyrightable portions of the plaintiff's work.” 
1 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW § 4:15, 
ELEMENTS OF AN INFRINGEMENT CLAIM; “SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY” TEST (2015). 
41 Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109–10 (9th Cir. 
1970). 
42 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991). 
43 See Sun Media Sys., Inc. v. KDSM, LLC, 564 F. Supp. 2d 946, 978 (S.D. Iowa 
2008); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994). 
44 Apple Computer, Inc., 35 F.3d at 1446. 
45 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
46 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
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In Feist Publications Inc., a telephone utility company 
brought a copyright infringement suit against the publisher of a 
telephone directory for using the utility company’s local white 
page listings.47  Plaintiff had taken the telephone listings from 
the defendant’s local telephone book and included those listings 
in their area-wide telephone directory.48  The listings were a list 
of names in alphabetical order along with each person’s 
respective telephone number.49  The court ultimately held that 
the alphabetical listing of names with corresponding telephone 
numbers received no protection under copyright law because the 
listings “lack[ed] the modicum of creativity necessary to 
transform mere selection into copyrightable expression.”50 
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT 
Should architectural works also be considered compilations?  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
answers that question in the affirmative, finding that 
architectural works should only receive thin protection because 
they resemble compilations.  The Second Circuit, on the other 
hand, disagrees, explaining that architectural works are an art 
form and should be afforded full protection under copyright law. 
A. The Eleventh Circuit’s Thin Protection Approach 
In Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., the Eleventh 
Circuit attempted to develop a procedure for properly analyzing 
when an architectural work has been infringed.51  There, the 
plaintiff had developed a design for a high-rise building, which 
incorporated alternating concave and convex segments and 
elevator cores, which protrude through the roofline of the 
building.52  The plaintiff then brought suit for copyright 
infringement after seeing advertisements, which depicted the 
renderings for the defendant’s new residential high-rise 
building.53  When analyzing if there was infringement, the court 
 
47 499 U.S. at 344. 
48 Id. at 343. 
49 Id. at 342. 
50 Id. at 362. 
51 527 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2008). 
52 Id. at 1226. 
53 Id. at 1225–26. 
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focused on the differences between the two buildings.54  In 
particular, the court looked to the differences in the elevator 
towers between the two buildings.55  The plaintiff’s elevator 
towers were free standing and were located within the 
“alternating concave and convex sections” of the building,56 while 
the defendant’s elevator towers were located completely within 
the structure.57  The plaintiff’s elevator towers were also 
cylindrical and grouped in the center of the building, whereas the 
defendant’s elevator towers were oval in shape and spread out 
evenly throughout the building.58  Finally, the terraces in the 
plaintiff’s design were full wraparound terraces, creating the 
appearance of a smooth surface, while the defendant’s building 
consisted of individual terraces, which created a jagged look.59  
The Eleventh Circuit ultimately concluded that no reasonable 
jury could find the two works substantially similar due to the 
striking differences between the two.60 
The Eleventh Circuit took its analysis of the copyright 
protectability of architectural works a step further in its seminal 
case, Intervest Construction, Inc. v. Canterbury Estate Homes, 
Inc.61  There, a builder who held the copyright for a floor plan of a 
four-bedroom house brought a copyright infringement action 
against a competing builder.62  Both floor plans were for a four 
bedroom house that covered approximately the same square 
footage and contained a two-car garage, living room, dining room, 
family room, foyer, master bathroom, kitchen, second bathroom, 
nook, and porch.63  The placement of “entrances, exits, hallways, 
openings, and utilities” was also the same in both plans.64 
When conducting its infringement analysis, the court found 
that “the definition of an architectural work closely parallels that 
of a ‘compilation’ under the statute,” because architectural works 
are the “arrangement and coordination of . . . common elements,” 
 
54 See id. at 1227. 
55 Id. at 1226. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 1227. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 1226. 
61 554 F.3d 914 (11th Cir. 2008). 
62 Id. at 916–17. 
63 Id. at 916. 
64 Id. 
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such as doors, windows, and walls.65  As a result, the Eleventh 
Circuit found that architectural works should be considered 
compiled works, which, under Feist, receive only thin copyright 
protection.66  The court went on to note that, at the summary 
judgment stage, a judge is “better able to separate original 
expression from the nonoriginal elements of a work,” than the 
jury.67 
The court found numerous subtle differences between the 
two designs.68  For example, the court noticed that the doors to 
one of the bedrooms opened in opposite directions.69  The court 
also noticed that a closet within the bedroom of the plaintiff’s 
house ran the length of the wall, while the closet in the 
defendant’s design was “deeper, smaller, and occupie[d] only a 
corner of the bedroom.”70  Finally, the defendant’s home design 
contained a “bonus room” above the garage, while the plaintiff’s 
design did not have any such room.71  The court concluded that, 
since the plaintiff’s work should only be afforded thin protection, 
summary judgment should be granted in favor of the defendant 
due to the differences between the two works.72 
Similarly, in Miller’s Ale House, Inc. v. Boynton Carolina Ale 
House, LLC, a restaurant operator sued for copyright 
infringement against a competing restaurant regarding the 
establishment’s interior layout.73  The plaintiff argued that the 
defendant copied their restaurant floor plan because defendant’s 
“rectangular bar at the center of the restaurant, booth seating,” 
high-top tables, kitchen and freezer area, and restrooms were all 
arranged in the same way as their own floor plan.74  Following 
the precedent set in both Oravec and Intervest, the Eleventh 
Circuit upheld summary judgment in favor of the defendant, 
stating that “modest dissimilarities are more significant than 
they may be in other types of art works.”75  The court noted that 
 
65 Id. at 919. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 920. 
68 Id. at 916–18. 
69 Id. at 917. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 921. 
73 702 F.3d 1312, 1324 (11th Cir. 2012). 
74 Id. at 1326. 
75 Id. (quoting Howard v. Sterchi, 974 F.2d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 1992)). 
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the arrangement of the pool tables and video games within each 
restaurant was different, and that the defendant’s restaurant 
had outside seating, while plaintiff’s restaurant did not.76  In 
addition to focusing its analysis on the difference between the 
two works, the court acknowledged that the thin protection 
afforded to architectural works was insufficient to support the 
plaintiff’s infringement claim.77 
Applying the test established in Intervest, the district court 
in Jeff Benton Homes v. Alabama Heritage Homes, Inc. also 
upheld summary judgment in favor of the defendant on a 
copyright infringement claim.78  The plaintiff constructed 
residential homes and held the copyright on two home designs.79  
Plaintiff sued the defendant, a competing homebuilder, for 
infringement based on the defendant’s home design.80  The court 
acknowledged that there were “undeniable similarities” between 
the two designs, explaining that the plans “share the same basic 
configuration of entrance foyer, living room, dining room, family 
room, and kitchen.”81  Additionally, the court found that the 
master bath in both the defendant’s and plaintiff’s designs 
contained “a double vanity, garden tub, separate shower, and 
separate water closet, and each master suite contain[ed] either 
one larger or two smaller walk-in closets.”82  Nevertheless, the 
court concluded that the differences between the two designs 
were “of the same scale as the differences between the [plaintiff’s] 
and [defendant’s] plans discussed in the . . . Intervest decision.”83  
In particular, the court looked to: (1) the differences in “the 
layout of the master suite”; (2) the differences in interior door 
and ceiling designs; (3) the “differences in window placement[;] 
[(4)] [the] presence of a walk-in pantry in only the [defendant’s 
design]”; (5) the absence of a hallway leading to the master suite 
in the plaintiff’s design; (6) the differences in interior wall angles; 
and (7) the different entry points to the guest bathroom.84  As a 
result, the court reached the same conclusion as the court in 
 
76 Id. at 1327. 
77 Id. 
78 929 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1255 (N.D. Ala. 2013). 
79 Id. at 1245, 1247. 
80 Id. at 1246. 
81 Id. at 1253. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 1254. 
84 Id. 
FINAL_COMMONS 10/20/2016  8:39 AM 
2016] COPYRIGHT PROTECTABILITY 479 
Intervest.85  The court upheld summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant because the differences between the works precluded 
an infringement claim.86 
B. The Second Circuit’s Traditional Approach 
The Second Circuit, on the other hand, has adopted a 
different methodology with regard to the copyright protectability 
of architectural works.  In Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. 
Simone Development Corp.,87 the court was tasked with 
determining the proper method for examining copyright 
infringement of an architectural design.  It concluded that the 
overall expression of the two works, rather than the differences 
between the two works, should be the driving force when 
determining if there is infringement.88  There, the plaintiff and 
defendant agreed to submit a joint proposal for a complex, which 
consisted of a residential high-rise tower, retail space at the base 
of the tower, a new pedestrian plaza, a public park, and an 
aboveground parking garage.89  The plaintiff subsequently 
registered his designs with the United States Copyright Office.90  
A dispute between the parties eventually led to a termination of 
their relationship, and the defendants later hired a different firm 
to proceed with the project.91  The plaintiff then brought suit, 
stating that the defendants unlawfully used the plaintiff’s 
copyrighted designs.92 
When determining whether there was infringement, the 
court refused to accept that it was “required to dissect [the 
works] into their separate components, and compare only those 
elements which are in themselves copyrightable.”93  The court 
instead focused on “comparing the contested design’s ‘total 
concept and overall feel’ with that of the allegedly infringed 
work.”94  Focusing on the work as a whole rather than just keying 
in on the differences is essential because “the defendant may 
 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 602 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2010). 
88 Id. at 66. 
89 Id. at 60. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 66 (alteration in original). 
94 Id. (citations omitted). 
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infringe on the plaintiff’s work not only through literal copying of 
a portion of it, but also by parroting properties that are apparent 
only when numerous aesthetic decisions embodied in the 
plaintiff’s work of art . . . are considered in relation to one 
another.”95  The court ultimately affirmed the grant of 
defendant’s motion to dismiss because “no more was taken than 
ideas and concepts.”96  This is due to the fact that the features 
which the defendant allegedly misappropriated were merely 
“common to countless other urban high-rise residential 
developments.”97 
In its seminal case, the Second Circuit, in Zalewski v. Cicero 
Builder Development, Inc., declined to find that architectural 
works should only receive thin protection, and expanded upon 
the idea set forth in Gaito, that the overall work must be 
examined when determining infringement.98  There, a self-
employed architect granted licenses to the defendants to use 
several of plaintiff’s designs.99  After the licenses had expired, the 
defendants continued to use and customize plaintiff’s designs.100  
The plaintiff brought suit against the defendants for copyright 
infringement, and the district court granted the defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment.101 
On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s 
theory that architectural works should be considered 
compilations.102  The court pointed to the fact that “architectural 
works and compilations are not the only works that are defined 
with reference to their discrete—and perhaps uncopyrightable—
elements.”103  It went on to note that classifying architectural 
 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 68. 
97 Id. 
98 754 F.3d 95, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2014). 
99 Id. at 98. 
100 Id. at 98–99. 
101 Id. at 99. The District Court found that “the overwhelming majority of the 
similarities can be attributed to the fact that both plaintiffs’ and defendants’ works 
are heavily influenced by, and incorporate hallmark features of, Colonial 
architecture.” Zalewski v. T.P. Builders, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 135, 153 (N.D.N.Y. 
2012) aff'd sub nom. Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 
2014). 
102 Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 104. 
103 Id. Despite the fact that literary works such as books and periodicals are 
made up of individual words and numbers, none of which are copyrightable on their 
own, the resulting product still receives full copyright protection. Id.; see Softel, Inc. 
v. Dragon Med. & Sci. Commc'ns, Inc., 118 F.3d 955, 964 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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works as compilations “obscures the real issue.”104  Every work of 
art is made up of uncopyrightable elements to some degree; the 
issue that must be addressed when handling a copyright 
infringement claim is what aspects of the work “originated with 
the author.”105  The court ultimately concluded that copyrights for 
architectural works should be treated the same as copyrights in 
other works, pointing to legislative history to support its 
assertion.106  When handling unique areas of creative expression, 
such as architecture, the court should merely apply the “usual 
copyright doctrines of merger, public domain, and scènes-à-faire 
to these new circumstances.”107 
Despite disagreeing with the Eleventh Circuit’s approach, 
the court still affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of 
the defendant.108  Although the plaintiff did add his own 
expression to the work, only “very close copying” would have 
infringed on the plaintiff’s design because plaintiff’s original 
contribution to the pre-existing colonial style was only slight.109  
The defendant only copied the generalities that are found in a 
colonial style home and did not use any of the plaintiff’s original 
expression.110  While both designs included the “hallmark 
features of[] Colonial architecture,” the court found significant 
differences between the dimensions and shapes of the rooms, the 
overall square footage of the homes, the window and door 
placement, the pitch and size of the roofs, and the layout of the 
rooms when comparing the two designs.111 
The decision leaves other circuits with the question of 
whether or not one will actually reach a different result if the 
Second Circuit’s approach is applied rather than the test set out 
by the Eleventh Circuit.  While it appears from subsequent 
decisions coming out of the Eleventh Circuit that the Intervest 
standard has the propensity to dispose of an infringement claim 
 
104 Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 104. 
105 Id.; see Rolwes Co. v. Barnes, No. 4:14CV1045, 2014 WL 3701039, at *3 (E.D. 
Mo. July 25, 2014) amended by No. 4:14CV1045, 2014 WL 4966071 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 
2014). 
106 Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 104. 
107 Id. at 105. 
108 Id. at 107. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Zalewski v. T.P. Builders, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 135, 153 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) 
aff'd sub nom. Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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before it reaches trial,112 it remains to be seen whether the 
Second Circuit’s approach will lead to the same result.  While in 
theory it would appear as though the Second Circuit’s approach 
could lead to more cases being decided by jury, the evolution of 
copyright law as a whole may prevent such an outcome.  This 
concern will be discussed in detail in the following section. 
The first court to follow the Second Circuit’s approach was 
the United States District Court of Missouri, Eastern Division.113  
In Rolwes Co. v. Barnes, the plaintiff, a homebuilder, held the 
copyright for his “Rockport design” of a single family home.114  He 
subsequently brought suit for copyright infringement after the 
defendant began construction of ten homes.115  Evidence was 
submitted that the defendants photocopied the plaintiff’s designs 
when applying for permits.116  The plaintiff also submitted 
evidence that the defendant submitted the plans in a redrawn 
handwritten form with the plaintiff’s name removed when 
applying for other permits.117 
Applying the approach set forth in Zalewski, the court 
recognized that it must “determine what aspects of Plaintiff’s 
Rockport design, if any, are copyrightable, and whether [the 
d]efendants’ designs feature substantially similar features.”118  
The court initially rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the 
placement of the stairs for the basement and the open kitchen 
entry were unique to the Rockport design.119  The hallmark of the 
plaintiff’s Rockport design is that it contains two ancillary 
bedrooms in the front of the house, and a master bedroom in the 
rear of the house.120  The ancillary bedrooms are not connected 
with the master bedroom via hallway and the master bedroom is 
 
112 See Intervest Constr., Inc. v. Canterbury Estate Homes, Inc., 554 F.3d 914, 
920 (11th Cir. 2008); Miller's Ale House, Inc. v. Boynton Carolina Ale House, LLC, 
702 F.3d 1312, 1324 (11th Cir. 2012); Jeff Benton Homes v. Ala. Heritage Homes 
Inc., 929 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1255 (N.D. Ala. 2013); Sieger Suarez Architectural 
P’ship, Inc. v. Arquitectonica Int’l Corp., 998 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2014). 
113 Rolwes Co. v. Barnes, No. 4:14CV1045, 2014 WL 3701039, at *3 (E.D. Mo. 
July 25, 2014) amended by No. 4:14CV1045, 2014 WL 4966071 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 
2014). 
114 Id. at *1. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at *3. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at *2. 
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accessed from a separate entryway in the great room of the 
house.121  The court, nevertheless, found that the defendant 
copied the “unique and copyrightable aspects” of the plaintiff’s 
design, after applying traditional copyright doctrines.122  The 
court noted that having the ancillary bedrooms in the front of the 
house, which are not connected to the master bedroom via 
hallway, and having access to the master bedroom through the 
great room at the rear of the house were unique expressions 
created by the plaintiff, which should be protected.123  As a result, 
the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction was granted 
“[b]ecause both parties [were] in agreement that the location of 
the bedrooms, which are serviced by two separate hallways, in 
1700 square foot house is unique to the Rockport design.”124 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE COMPETING APPROACHES 
This Note argues that, as other circuits come across the 
same issue and are faced with a choice of what standard they 
should apply, they should adopt the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit’s approach to the copyright 
protectability of architectural works.  The rationale behind the 
Second Circuit’s approach is expressly rooted in Title 17 and 
supported by legislative history.125  Additionally, the Eleventh 
Circuit’s belief that architectural works should only receive thin 
protection runs the risk of infringing upon the constitutional 
rights of architects.  The approach makes the judge the fact 
finder, potentially depriving the plaintiff of their right to a jury 
trial.126  Finally, courts should avoid the Eleventh Circuit’s 
approach because of the resultant public policy implications.  
Thin protection creates an insufficient incentive for architects 
because it may encourage them to become hesitant to invest 
significant time and money into their work.127  Ultimately, the  
 
 
 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at *4. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at *3. 
125 Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 103–04 (2d Cir. 2014); see 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 1 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6935. 
126 Milbrath, supra note 9, at 51. 
127 Id. at 50–51. 
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United States Supreme Court or Congress must set the record 
straight and clarify the copyright protectability of architectural 
works. 
A. Statutory Support 
Both Circuits claim support for their respective approaches 
within the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990.  
Meant to put the United States in compliance with the Berne 
Convention,128 the Act specifically defines “architectural work” as 
a term completely separate from a “compilation” or “collective 
work.”129  Despite this distinction, the Eleventh Circuit in 
Intervest argued that “the definition of architectural work[s] 
closely parallels that of a ‘compilation’ ” and therefore both 
should receive the same level of protection.130  The Eleventh 
Circuit keyed in on the description of a compilation, which are 
works “formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting 
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in 
such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an 
original work of authorship,” and argued that architectural 
works are formed in a largely similar manner.131  The Second 
Circuit addressed this argument by pointing directly to the 
statute.132  While both “architectural works” and “compilations” 
can be defined as “arrangement[s],” and both are made up of 
“standard elements,” other fully protected works are also defined 
while referencing their uncopyrightable elements.133  Title 17 
defines “motion pictures” as a “series of related images,” and 
“literary works” as works “expressed in words, numbers or other 
verbal or numerical symbols or indicia.”134  Images, words, and 
numbers are all standard uncopyrightable elements, yet motion 
pictures and literary works enjoy full protection under copyright 
law.135  Therefore, the argument that architectural works should,  
 
 
 
128 MERGES ET AL., supra note 14, at 500. 
129 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
130 Intervest Constr., Inc. v. Canterbury Estate Homes, Inc., 554 F.3d 914, 919 
(11th Cir. 2008). 
131 Id. 
132 Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 104 (2d Cir. 2014). 
133 Id.; see § 101. 
134 § 101. 
135 Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 103−04. 
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like compilations, receive only thin protection due to the 
similarities between the two definitions seems to fail when 
examining the definitions of other works under Title 17. 
It is worth noting that 17 U.S.C. § 120 makes certain 
qualifications to the protection of architectural works.136  Title 17 
states that the copyright protection of an architectural work is 
not meant to prevent others from making pictures, paintings, or 
photographs of an ordinarily visible building.137  The statute also 
authorizes alterations or destruction of the building without the 
need for the copyright owner’s consent.138 
B. Legislative History 
The Second Circuit’s approach also finds support from 
legislative history.  The court in Zalewski looked specifically to 
House Report 101-735,139 where the Committee of the Judiciary 
provided commentary regarding the 1990 amendment of Title 17 
relating to architectural works.140  While examining the 
characteristics of architecture, the committee drew comparisons 
to poetry.141  The committee looked to a quote by Ada Louise 
Huxtable,142 who stated, “architects can make ‘poetry out of 
visual devices, as a writer uses literary or aural devices.  As 
words become symbols, so do objects; the architectural world is 
an endless source of symbols with unique ramifications in time 
and space.’ ”143  The Committee went on to cite Frank Lloyd 
 
136 17 U.S.C. § 120 (2012). 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 754 F.3d at 104. 
140 H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 11–14 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 
6942–45. 
141 Id. at 6943−44. 
142 Ada Louise Huxtable was known as the first full-time architecture critic. 
David W. Dunlap, Ada Louise Huxtable, Champion of Livable Architecture, Dies at 
91, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/08/arts/design/ada-
louise-huxtable-architecture-critic-dies-at-91.html. Huxtable was a Pulitzer Prize 
winning journalist for The New York Times, known specifically for her commentaries 
on architecture. Id. Her work drew mainly upon the social aspects of architecture 
and how the structures represent “the collective spirit that we call society.” Id. 
143 H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 12–13, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6943–44. 
The Committee stressed the importance of architecture in people’s daily lives, “not 
only as a form of shelter or as an investment, but also as a work of art.” Id. at 6943. 
It is an art form that “performs a very public, social purpose.” Id. They went on to 
recognize that “[b]uildings will always remain the most valuable aspect in a people's 
environment, the one most capable of cultural reaction.” Id. The Committee then 
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Wright, who declared, “the design of a work of architecture is a 
‘writing’ under the Constitution and fully deserves protection 
under the Copyright Act.”144  Finally, the Committee noted that 
architectural works “stimulate excellence in design, thereby 
enriching our public environment in keeping with the 
constitutional goal.”145 
The Committee’s examination of the issue of whether there 
should be limitations on injunctive relief regarding infringement 
of architectural works furthers the conclusion that architectural 
works should receive full protection under copyright law.146  
When contemplating if there should be limitations on injunctive 
relief, the Committee weighed both the possibility that an 
infringing structure could cause “irreparable injury to the 
copyright owner” and the strong public policy in favor of not 
destroying useful buildings.147  It was ultimately concluded that 
injunctive relief for infringement of architectural works should be 
governed by “general principles applicable to all categories of 
subject matter,” and the complexities of granting the injunction 
will be determined on a case-by-case basis.148 
Finally, the Committee concluded that “general standards of 
originality” should apply for architectural works, and that 
determinations of infringement of architectural works should “be 
made according to the same standard applicable to all other 
forms of protected subject matter.”149  The Committee went on to 
state that the language of the definition of architectural works, 
such as the nonprotectibility of “individual standard features” 
does not indicate that a “higher standard of similarity is required 
to prove infringement,” or that protection is “limited to verbatim 
or near-verbatim copying.”150  Instead, the conclusion of the 
House Committee seems to indicate that copyrights for 
architectural works should be held to the same standard as other 
copyrights. 
 
provided the Capitol building as an example, explaining that it “serves as a strong 
symbol of our country's dedication to democracy.” Id. 
144 Id. at 6944. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 6945. 
149 Id. at 6952. 
150 Id. 
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The House Committee also explained the limitations on 
protection for architectural works set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 120.151  
With regard to subsection 120(a), which prevents copyright law 
for architectural works from extending to pictorial 
representations of the structure, the Committee explained that 
architectural works are a “public art form” and should be 
“enjoyed as such.”152  The photography of architecture is used not 
only to memorialize one’s trip to a city, but also as a teaching 
mechanism in numerous scholarly books on architecture.153  
Permitting photography of architectural works does “not 
interfere with the normal exploitation of [such] works.”154  The 
subsection was meant not only to comply with the Berne 
Convention, but also to “provide an exemption, rather than rely 
on the doctrine of fair use” when dealing with a claim for 
infringement regarding a photograph.155  Subsection (b), which 
authorizes the destruction or alteration of the work without the 
architect’s consent, was meant by the legislature to expressly 
state that subsection 109(a)—which permits an owner of a 
phonorecord to “sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that 
copy of phonorecord”—is meant to apply to architectural works.156 
The House Report makes it clear that the intentions of the 
Committee are embodied in the Second Circuit’s approach.  
Rather than grant architectural works only thin protection, the 
Second Circuit recognized the legislature’s intention that there 
should not be a higher standard of similarity between the works 
to prove infringement.157  As a result, the court in Zalewski 
concluded that the “usual copyright doctrines,” such as the 
doctrine of merger, public domain, scènes-à-faire, and the idea-
expression dichotomy, should apply when examining copyright 
infringement of architectural works.158  Applying thin protection 
would essentially protect architectural works only from verbatim 
copying, which goes beyond the intentions of the legislature.159 
 
151 Id. at 6953. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 6953−54. 
157 Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 104 (2d Cir. 2014). 
158 Id. at 105. 
159 H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 21, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6952. 
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Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit’s focus on the 
dissimilarities between the original work and the work in 
question cuts directly against the legislative intent, which 
suggests that the overall design should be taken into account 
when evaluating the scope of protection.  The House Committee 
suggested a two-part test for determining such scope.160  The first 
step requires one to “determine whether there are original design 
elements present, including overall shape and interior 
architecture.”161  If there are in fact original design elements, one 
must determine if the elements are functionally required.162  If 
not, then the work is protectable.163  The Committee went on to 
state that the “aesthetically pleasing overall shape of an 
architectural work could be protected.”164  Rather than examining 
the overall design or similarities between both the original work 
and the work in question, the Eleventh Circuit has chosen to 
focus primarily on the differences between the works.165  By 
comparing only the differences between two works, the Eleventh 
Circuit’s approach has the potential to lose sight of the overall 
shape of the original work—a factor that the legislature 
suggested should be taken into account and protected.166  
Scholars have further concluded that, because courts have 
 
160 Id. at 6951−52. 
161 Id. at 6951. 
162 Id. at 6951−52. 
163 Id. at 6952. 
164 Id. 
165 See Intervest Constr., Inc. v. Canterbury Estate Homes, Inc., 554 F.3d 914, 
921 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that dissimilarities between the two floor plans were 
sufficient to conclude that “no reasonable, properly instructed jury could find the 
works substantially similar”); Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 
F.3d 1218, 1226, 1228 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that the “numerous significant 
differences” between the partially exposed elevator towers and the use of concave 
and convex sections was enough to conclude that the works were substantially 
similar); Miller's Ale House, Inc. v. Boynton Carolina Ale House, LLC, 702 F.3d 
1312, 1324 (11th Cir. 2012); Howard v. Sterchi, 974 F.2d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 1992). 
Scholars have found the Eleventh Circuit’s focus on the differences rather than the 
similarities “unorthodox.” Milbrath, supra note 9, at 51. 
166 Courts have found that specifically focusing on dissimilarities is an improper 
approach when determining infringement. See Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 
898, 901 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that “[d]issection of dissimilarities is inappropriate 
because it distracts a reasonable observer from a comparison of the total concept and 
feel of the works”); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 
1936) (finding that “no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his 
work he did not pirate”); Steven T. Lowe, Death of Copyright, 33-NOV L.A. L. 32, 34 
(2010). 
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applied only thin protection to architectural works, the 
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act has not had a 
significant “impact on stimulating excellence in design in the 
United States,” like Congress intended.167 
The Second Circuit’s approach, on the other hand, takes into 
account both the similarities and differences between the works, 
in accordance with the legislative history.  In Zalewski, the court 
examined the “overall footprint” of the structure and found that 
the similarities between the two works stemmed only from the 
“generalities of the style.”168  Rather than base judgment 
primarily upon the differences between works, the Second 
Circuit’s approach more adequately follows the intent of the 
legislature by examining the overall similarities between the 
works.169 
C. Public Policy Considerations 
1. Eleventh Circuit Approach Contrary to Public Policy 
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit’s approach seems 
troublesome on public policy grounds.  Article I, Section 8, Clause 
8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the 
[p]rogress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
[t]imes to [a]uthors and [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their 
respective [w]ritings and [d]iscoveries.”170  The Supreme Court 
has stated that the purpose of granting an author a monopoly 
over her original expression “lie[s] in the general benefits derived 
by the public from the labors of authors.”171  The monopoly over 
the expression “serves to induce release to the public of the 
products of his creative genius.”172 
The issue still remains over how much protection original 
expression should be afforded.  Granting broad protection to 
works may actually inhibit the progress of science rather than 
 
167 David E. Shipley, The Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act at 
Twenty: Has Full Protection Made A Difference?, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 59 (2010). 
168 Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 106–07 (2d Cir. 2014). 
169 Id.; see H.R. REP. NO. 101-735, at 21 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6935, 6952. 
170 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
171 United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); see Morton 
Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 8. 
172 Paramount Pictures, 344 U.S. at 158. 
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promote it because a broad grant has the potential to diminish 
the “store of ideas” on which others should be free to build.173  On 
the other hand, if copyright protection proves to be too narrow, 
then it has the potential to erode an author’s incentive to create 
and develop innovative works because the possibility of personal 
gain is greatly diminished.174  
By applying thin protection to architectural works, the 
Eleventh Circuit runs the risk of creating an insufficient 
incentive for architects to design and create original structures.  
Since architectural works would only be protected from 
essentially verbatim copying under the Eleventh Circuit’s 
approach, potential infringers can create structures that are 
substantially similar to the original work, yet suffer no 
consequences.  As a result, these potential infringers can avoid 
the costly process of designing an original structure by merely 
constructing a structure that is substantially similar to an 
original work that is already in existence.  Architects will 
therefore be less likely to create an original expression, since 
substantially similar structures can be created without 
consequence. 
2. Second Circuit Approach Advances Public Policy 
On the other hand, one may argue that the Second Circuit’s 
approach provides architects with overbroad protection of their 
works, preventing, rather than promoting, the advancement of 
art and science.  The argument fails because the Second Circuit 
took such considerations into account when developing its 
standard.  The court in Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc. 
recognized that “[a]rchitects cannot claim that good engineering 
is original to them—or at least can get no copyright protection for 
it.”175  Additionally, the Second Circuit’s approach determines 
copyright protectability on a case-by-case basis.176  Applying the 
 
173 Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1225 (11th Cir. 
2008); see Milbrath, supra note 9, at 51. 
174 See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 2013); Milbrath, supra note 
9, at 50–51; Anthony R. Enriquez, The Destructive Impulse of Fair Use After Cariou 
v. Prince, 24 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 27 (2013). 
175 754 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2014); see Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. 
Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 68 (2d Cir. 2010). 
176 Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 104–05; see Rolwes Co. v. Barnes, No. 4:14CV1045, 
2014 WL 3701039, at *3 (E.D. Mo. July 25, 2014) amended by No. 4:14CV1045, 2014 
WL 4966071 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2014). 
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idea-expression dichotomy similarly prevents against overbroad 
protection of an architect’s work.177  The dichotomy ensures that 
only the architect’s original expression is protected, not the 
generalized ideas and concepts surrounding the expression.178  
The court’s application of the usual copyright doctrines of 
merger, public domain, and scènes-à-faire will also serve to 
ensure that only an architect’s original expression will be 
protected.179  Thus, adequate safeguards have been put in place 
by the Second Circuit to prevent protection of architectural works 
from extending too broadly and inhibiting the progression of art 
and science. 
D. Constitutional Concerns 
1. Potential Infringement of Seventh Amendment Rights 
The Eleventh Circuit’s approach also has the potential to 
curtail a copyright holder’s constitutional rights.  The Seventh 
Amendment of the Constitution explicitly grants one the right to 
a trial by jury.180  When handling copyright infringement issues, 
courts are in agreement that the issue of substantial similarity is 
a question of fact, and therefore summary judgment is 
traditionally frowned upon.181  Courts view the jury as the proper 
decision maker when deciding if there is substantial similarity 
due to the “inherently subjective nature of the inquiry.”182 
Despite these considerations, in the Eleventh Circuit’s 
seminal case, Intervest Construction, Inc. v. Canterbury Estate 
Homes, Inc.,183 the judge decided that that the question of 
substantial similarity at the level of protectable expression 
regarding compilations is a question best answered by a judge at 
a summary judgment proceeding.184  The judge essentially 
concluded that the question of potential infringement with 
regard to architectural works should be considered a question of 
 
177 Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 105. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
181 Latimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1232 (11th Cir. 2010); see Jones 
v. Blige, 558 F.3d 485, 490 (6th Cir. 2009); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
618 F.2d 972, 978 (2d Cir. 1980). 
182 Latimer, 601 F.3d at 1232. 
183 554 F.3d 914 (11th Cir. 2008). 
184 Id. at 920. 
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law, citing no relevant authority to support his assertion.185  He 
justified his conclusion by explaining that “a judge is better able 
to separate original expression from the non-original elements of 
a work where the copying of the latter is not protectable and the 
copying of the former is protectable.”186  He went on to note that 
the idea-expression dichotomy is difficult to apply because there 
is no bright-line test, and since the judge better understands the 
dichotomy, he is in a better position to make the 
determination.187  The test for infringement is “more often 
correctly administered by a judge rather than a jury—even one 
provided proper instruction.”188 
The opinion in Intervest is a profound departure from 
traditional copyright theory, which provides that the issue of 
substantial similarity is a question of fact for the jury to decide.  
The opinion effectively transfers decision-making power from the 
jury to the judge.189  If the approach in Intervest is adopted, many 
copyright infringement cases, which would normally go to trial 
based on fact issues surrounding substantial similarity, would 
instead be resolved at the summary judgment level.  The 
application prevents copyright owners from litigating their 
claims before a jury, potentially denying their Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial. 
2. Second Circuit Avoids The Issue 
One may argue that the Second Circuit’s approach also has 
the potential to infringe on a copyright owner’s Seventh 
Amendment rights, as evidenced by the court in Zalewski 
upholding summary judgment despite rejecting the Eleventh 
Circuit’s approach.  This argument fails because, while summary 
judgment may still be granted under the Second Circuit’s 
approach, it should theoretically occur less often.  This is due to 
the fact that granting thin protection makes it much easier for a 
court to conclude that there are no genuine issues of material 
fact.  The heightened standard will compel more courts to grant 
 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. Scholars have interpreted the opinion as coming “close to adopting a de 
novo process for determining the substantial similarity issue.” Milbrath, supra note 
9, at 51. 
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summary judgment than if normal copyright standards are 
applied.  Since the Second Circuit applies traditional copyright 
doctrines rather than thin protection, the threshold to prove 
copyright infringement will be less onerous, and therefore 
summary judgment will be less appropriate more often. 
For example, when a defendant moves for summary 
judgment on a copyright infringement claim, if thin protection is 
the standard, then the defendant need only prove that no 
reasonable jury could determine that the defendant copied the 
plaintiff’s work verbatim.190  Therefore, for a fact issue to exist, 
there must be enough evidence to establish that there was 
potentially verbatim copying.  Evidence that the works were 
substantially similar will not be sufficient to survive summary 
judgment.191  On the other hand, if traditional copyright doctrines 
are applied, the defendant not only has to show that there was no 
verbatim copying, but also he must show that a jury would not be 
able to find the two works to be substantially similar.192  For a 
fact issue to exist under traditional copyright law, evidence of 
verbatim copying is not required, there must only be evidence 
that the two works were substantially similar.193 
3. Constitutional Concerns with Copyright Law Generally 
Although the Second Circuit’s approach should, in theory, 
better protect an architect’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury 
trial, recent developments within copyright law generally may 
erode such protection.  Preventing one from exercising their 
Seventh Amendment right to a jury in a copyright infringement 
case is not an issue exclusive to architectural works.194  Courts 
have begun to favor deciding all sorts of copyright infringement 
cases at the summary judgment level, “removing both experts 
and juries from the process entirely.”195  For example, courts have 
become “more willing to dismiss expert witnesses to screenplay 
copyright infringement claims and analyze the works 
themselves.”196  As a result, the judge is acting as a “self-
 
190 See FED R. CIV. P. 56(a). 
191 See id. 
192 See id. 
193 See id. 
194 Lowe, supra note 166, at 32, 34. 
195 Id. at 36. 
196 Id. 
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appointed expert.”197  Thus, the constitutional implications of 
court policy favoring summary judgment regarding copyright 
infringement stretch far beyond architectural works and should 
be remedied immediately. 
CONCLUSION 
When determining what degree of copyright protection 
architectural works should receive, federal courts should adopt 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s 
approach, which requires architectural works to be governed by 
the same standards as all other copyrights.  The Second Circuit’s 
approach is directly rooted in both the statutory language as well 
as in the legislative history, which suggests that architectural 
works should be treated the same as other copyrights.  The 
Eleventh Circuit’s approach, however, directly contradicts 
legislative history by suggesting that architectural works should 
only receive thin protection under copyright law because the 
definition of architectural works closely resembles the definition 
of a compilation.  This approach not only cuts against legislative 
history, but also has the potential to deny a copyright holder’s 
constitutional rights because thin protection increases the 
likelihood that a copyright infringement case will be decided at 
summary judgment rather than at trial. 
Finally, affording architectural works only thin protection 
violates public policy, which seeks to encourage the advancement 
of art and science.  The lack of protection has the ability to create 
an insufficient incentive for architects to create original works 
because their resulting product would receive little protection 
from potential copying.  In contrast, the Second Circuit affords 
architectural works the same protection as other copyrights, 
avoiding Constitutional issues and maintaining the incentives for 
architects to continue to construct original structures.  At this 
time, it is essential that the Supreme Court or Congress resolve 
this apparent disagreement between the circuits and determine 
the proper degree of protection that architectural works should 
be afforded. 
 
197 Id. 
